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Table 2.1. *The entry game*

2 / 1	E	NE
E	$-f, -f$	$\Pi_M - f, 0$
NE	$0, \Pi_M - f$	0, 0

Table 2.2. *Consumers 1 and 2's payoffs under price discrimination*

1 \ 2	buy I	buy E
buy I	$v(2) - p_1, 0$	$v(2) - p_1, -c_E$
buy E	$-c_E, 0$	$v(2) - c_E, v(2) - c_E$

Table 4.1. *The revelation game*

firm 2 / *firm* 1	Reveal	Not Reveal
Reveal	$\frac{\Pi_N}{1-\delta} - R,$ $\frac{\Pi_N}{1-\delta} - R$	$\frac{\Pi_N}{1-\delta} - R,$ $\frac{\Pi_N}{1-\delta} - F$
Not Reveal	$\frac{\Pi_N}{1-\delta} - F,$ $\frac{\Pi_N}{1-\delta} - R$	$p(\frac{\Pi_N}{1-\delta} - F) + (1-p)\frac{\Pi_M}{1-\delta},$ $p(\frac{\Pi_N}{1-\delta} - F) + (1-p)\frac{\Pi_M}{1-\delta}$

Table 5.1. *Number of final decisions on mergers taken by the EC Commission*



Source. Report on Competition Policy, European Commission, DG IV (various years)

Table 5.2. *Product market definition in the rail technology industry*

Rolling stock	Mainline trains	Electrical locomotives Diesel locomotives Train sets for mainline transportation Passenger coaches Freight wagons
	Regional trains	Electrical multiple units Diesel multiple units
	Local trains and systems	Trams (light rail and trolleys) Metro vehicles Automated guided transportation
Stationary equipment	Wayside systems	Catenary systems Traction power supply Train control and protection systems
	Miscellaneous	Maintenance and refurbishment Information systems and ticketing

Table 5.3. *Market shares and concentration indexes in the rail technology industry*

Product Market	Market Shares (%)						HHI	Δ HHI
	ABB	DB	Siemens	DWA	LHB	Elpro		
Electrical locom.	37	17	46	np	np	Np	5032	1258
Mainline train sets	5	26	46	18	np	Np	>3401	260
Reg. electr. m/units	18	26	25	17	14	Np	>3046	936
Reg. diesel m/units	0	49	23	np	19	Np	>3291	0
Trams	15	29	41	np	8	Np	>3681	870
Metro vehicles	42	22	19	np	11	Np	>4578	1848
Catenary systems	30	31	33	np	np	6	4846	1860
Traction power supply	6	26	35	np	np	13	>2418	312

Table 6.1. *Segal-Whinston: simultaneous offers*

*B*2 / *B*1	Accept	Reject
Accept	CS^m+t, CS^m+t	CS^m+t, CS^m
Reject	CS^m, CS^m+t	CS^e, CS^e

Table 6.2. *Segal-Whinston: discriminatory offers*

$B1$ \ $B2$	Accept	Reject
Accept	CS^m+t_1, CS^m+t_2	CS^m+t_1, CS^m
Reject	CS^m, CS^m+t_2	CS^e, CS^e

Table 7.1. *Consumer valuations of goods*

	1's willingness to pay	2's willingness to pay
Good A	7	4
Good B	5	8
Goods A and B	12	12

Table 8.1. *A simple game*

A \ B	b_1	b_2	b_3
a_1	2, 0	2, 5	1, 1
a_2	0, 2	0, 3	2, 2

Table 8.2. *The prisoners' dilemma game*

B / A	*High*	*Low*
High	10, 10	5, 15
Low	15, 5	6, 6

Table 8.3. *The battle of the sexes game*

B / A	*Indian*	*Thai*
Indian	3, 2	0, -1
Thai	-1, 0	2, 3

Table 8.4. *A pure coordination game*

B / A	*Indian*	*Italian*
Indian	2, 2	0, 0
Italian	0, 0	1, 1

Table 8.5. *An asymmetric game*

A \ B	p_L	p_H
p_L	0, 0	0, 0
p_H	0, -2	2, 0

Table 8.6. *The matching pennies game*

B / A	*Heads*	*Tails*
Heads	-1, 1	1, -1
Tails	1, -1	-1, 1

Table 8.7. *The entry deterrence game*

E \ I	*Accommodate*	*Fight*
Enter	4, 5	-1, 0
Stay out	0, 10	0, 10

Table 8.8. *Strategic effect of a shock that reduces firm 1's costs*

Strategic substitutes	*Strategic complements*
Accommodation: $\pi_1 \uparrow$; $\pi_2 \downarrow$	Accommodation: $\pi_1 \downarrow$; $\pi_2 \downarrow$
Entry deterrence: $\pi_2 \downarrow$ ($\Rightarrow \pi_1 \uparrow$)	Entry deterrence: $\pi_2 \downarrow$ ($\Rightarrow \pi_1 \uparrow$)

Table 8.9. *Strategic investments to reduce firm 1's costs*

Strategic substitutes	*Strategic complements*
Accommodation: *over-invest*	Accommodation: *under-invest*
Entry deterrence: *over-invest*	Entry deterrence: *over-invest*