## **Index of Figures**

Figure 2.1. Welfare loss from monopoly

Figure 2.2. Possible additional loss from rent seeking activities

Figure 2.3. Additional loss from productive inefficiency

Figure 2.4. Welfare  $W^c$  as a function of the number of firms n (a = 1; c = .5; g = 4)

Figure 4.1. Incentive Constraints along collusive and punishment paths

Figure 4.2. Conditions for collusion: Nash reversal  $(\delta^{cn})$  v. two-phase  $(\underline{\delta})$  punishment strategies

Figure 4.3. Game tree, at t = 2

Figure 4.4. Equilibrium solutions for given policy parameters

Figure 5.1. Effects of a merger absent efficiency gains: Strategic complements

Figure 5.2. Effects of a merger absent efficiency gains: Strategic substitutes

Figure 5.3. Effects of a merger with efficiency gains

Figure 5.4. Levels of efficiency gains and exclusion of competitors

Figure 5.5. Study of functions used in Lemma 7

Figure 6.1. Double marginalisation

Figure 6.2. Horizontal externality

Figure 6.3. Competing vertical chains

Figure 6.4. Tariffs as strategic device: Strategic complements

Figure 6.5. Tariffs as strategic device: Strategic substitutes

Figure 6.6. The "Chicago School" critique to foreclosure

Figure 6.7. Segal-Whinston: sequential offers

Figure 7.1. State game at time t, chain-store paradox game

Figure 7.2. Deep pocket predation, with T = K = 1

Figure 7.3. Time line: a (financial) long purse model of predation

Figure 7.4. Time line: Bolton-Scharfstein's model

Figure 7.5. Entry-deterring investment

Figure 7.6. Strategic effect of bundling

Figure 7.7. Welfare under perfect price competition

Figure 8.1. Extensive form of the game

Figure 8.2. Extensive form of a quality game

Figure 8.3. Reaction functions in the Cournot model

Figure 8.4. Toughness of product market competition: Bertrand (B), Cournot (C), and joint-profits maximization (M)

Figure 8.5. Reaction functions under price competition

Figure 8.6. (a) Stable Nash Equilibrium; (b) Unstable Nash Equilibrium

Figure 8.7. Effects of a shock (s > 0) that reduces firm 1's marginal cost: Strategic substitutes

Figure 8.8. Effects of a shock (s > 0) that reduces firm 1's marginal cost: Strategic complements











(b)



![](_page_8_Figure_0.jpeg)

![](_page_9_Figure_0.jpeg)

![](_page_11_Figure_0.jpeg)

![](_page_12_Figure_0.jpeg)

![](_page_13_Figure_0.jpeg)

![](_page_14_Figure_0.jpeg)

![](_page_15_Figure_0.jpeg)

![](_page_16_Figure_0.jpeg)

![](_page_17_Figure_0.jpeg)

![](_page_18_Figure_0.jpeg)

![](_page_19_Figure_0.jpeg)

![](_page_20_Figure_0.jpeg)

![](_page_21_Figure_0.jpeg)

![](_page_22_Figure_0.jpeg)

![](_page_23_Figure_0.jpeg)

![](_page_24_Figure_0.jpeg)

1	<b>_</b>	2	3		→ time
prey or	1st period	pay F	effort	2nd period	
accommoda	te payoff	or out	decisions	payoff	

> time		3	2	•	1	ii	i
	/	•	•	•	•	•	•
	2nd period	effort	pay F	1st period	prey or	effort	contract
	payoff	decisions	or out	payoff	accommodate	decisions	

![](_page_27_Figure_0.jpeg)

![](_page_28_Figure_0.jpeg)

![](_page_29_Figure_0.jpeg)

![](_page_30_Figure_0.jpeg)

![](_page_31_Figure_0.jpeg)

![](_page_32_Figure_0.jpeg)

![](_page_33_Figure_0.jpeg)

![](_page_34_Figure_0.jpeg)

![](_page_35_Figure_0.jpeg)

![](_page_36_Figure_0.jpeg)

![](_page_37_Figure_0.jpeg)